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Abstract
This paper explores the impact of memory in Cournot oligopolies
where ﬁrms learn through imitation of success (as suggested in Alchian
(1950) and modeled in Vega-Redondo (1997)). As long as memory in-
cludes at least one period, the long-run outcomes correspond to all the
quantities in the interval between the Cournot quantity and the Walras
one. There is a conceptual tension between the evolutionary stability as-
sociated to the walrasian outcome, which relies on inter-ﬁrm comparisons
of simultaneous proﬁts, and the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
derived from intertemporal comparisons of proﬁts.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D83, L13.
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1 Introduction
The stream of the learning literature initiated by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
(1993) and Young (1993) has seen a growing number of applications to oligopoly
theory in the last years. Starting with the analysis of a Cournot oligopoly
presented in Vega-Redondo (1997) (extended in diﬀerent directions in Al´ os-
Ferrer, Ania, and Vega-Redondo (1999), Tanaka (1999) and K.R.Schenk-Hopp´ e
(2000)), further applications have been studied for Bertrand oligopolies (Al´ os-
Ferrer, Ania, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2000) and Hehenkamp (2000)), diﬀerentiated-
goods oligopolies (Tanaka (2000)), signaling (N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1997)),
and insurance markets (Ania, Tr¨ oger, and Wambach (2001)).
All these models are based on the ideas pointed out by Alchian (1950). In
summary, ﬁrms adapt via imitation and trial and error. Imitation is based on
observed success, where “success” is deﬁned in terms of achieving the highest
proﬁts. Trial and error is modeled through an experimentation (also called “mu-
tation”) parameter, which gives ﬁrms a (small) probability of trying something
new.
The success of this approach in oligopoly models is due both to conceptual
and technical reasons. Conceptually, real oligopolies are extremely complex sit-
uations where agents (ﬁrms) are bound to to use simple rules of thumb (relative
to the complexity of the environment) to save decision costs. Technically, the
long-run outcome of the process as the experimentation parameter goes to zero
1(i.e. for small perturbations) can be characterized through the techniques de-
veloped in Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), which were not available when Alchian
wrote his seminal paper, but nowadays are already contained in several lead-
ing books on the subject of learning (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1998),
Samuelson (1997), or Young (1998)).
The general idea is analogous to the one underlying evolutionary models,
where agents obtaining higher payoﬀs thrive at the expense of others. In
oligopoly applications, the strategies (whether quantities, prices, or insurance
contracts) leading to higher proﬁts are promptly imitated and come to dominate
the population.
In an oligopoly, this idea has interesting implications. In Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Al´ os-Ferrer, Ania, and Vega-Redondo (1999), the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is quickly discarded in favor of the “walrasian” one (where ﬁrms
set price equal to marginal cost) due to the eﬀects of spite, which show that,
with imitation of highest proﬁts only relative payoﬀs matter. On the one hand,
even if ﬁrms deviating from the walrasian equilibrium earn higher proﬁts than
before, those not deviating are left with even higher proﬁts; thus, the deviant
ﬁnds himself in a bad relative position. On the other hand, ﬁrms deviating from
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to produce the walrasian quantity achieve lower
proﬁts than before, but those not deviating are left with even lower proﬁts; thus,
the deviant ﬁnds himself in a good relative position.
As pointed out in Al´ os-Ferrer (2000), there is nothing to object to the re-
ferred idea in a biological framework, where agents live one period and are
replaced by their oﬀspring. Doubts arise, though, when the same arguments are
applied to learning models in economics, in particular to ﬁrms. Since ﬁrms do
not die, but presumably try to learn, the eﬀects of spite rely on the fact that
previous outcomes (e.g. the proﬁts of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium) are imme-
diately forgotten and only the current comparison of proﬁts matters. Besides,
if the results of even the most recent period are forgotten, it is diﬃcult to inter-
pret the experimentation process as trial and error, since an error might only
be perceived as such when compared with previous results. Hence, it might be
worth investigating how the models mentioned above models are aﬀected once
ﬁrms are allowed to use the information gained in, at least, the most recent
periods of play.
Al´ os-Ferrer (2000) poses this question for general learning models and shows
that the introduction of (bounded) memory can have quite strong implications.1
For instance, the results obtained in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) for
coordination games can be reversed. More important, it is shown that, even in
models based on imitation and experimentation, where best response plays no
role, there is still a certain signiﬁcance to the concept of Nash equilibrium, since
the intertemporal comparison of payoﬀs after a unilateral deviation from a Nash
equilibrium will always, by deﬁnition, allow the agents to perceive such deviation
as an error and correct it by imitation of past (before-deviation) strategies.
This paper explores the impact of adding ﬁnite memory to the models of
Cournot Oligopoly mentioned above. It is shown that, as long as memory
includes at least one period, the walrasian outcome is not anymore the only
1Young (1993) studies a diﬀerent model where agents, sampled from two diﬀerent popu-
lations, obtain a sample of records from past interactions before engaging in an asymmetric
game. Due to the addition of sampling and fundamental diﬀerences in the modeling of agent
interaction, Young’s memory can not be directly compared to the one in Al´ os-Ferrer (2000).
2long-run outcome as in Vega-Redondo (1997). On the contrary, there is a clear
tension between the walrasian outcome and the Cournot equilibrium, which
stabilizes the whole range of quantities between them.
It is important to stress that this result obtains already with a single pe-
riod of memory, for an arbitrary number of ﬁrms. This shows that the result
in Vega-Redondo (1997), which is based on the relative payoﬀ considerations
mentioned above, is not robust with respect to the absolute payoﬀ considera-
tions introduced by memory. It is also worth noticing that, as in Vega-Redondo
(1997), ﬁrms are pure imitators (i.e. they are neither supposed to know their
proﬁt functions nor to be able to compute a best reply). Hence, the diﬀerence
in the results is due exclusively to the introduction of memory.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Vega-Redondo (1997) studies a model where boundedly rational ﬁrms compete
in quantities following a dynamics of imitation and experimentation. The strik-
ing conclusion is that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium does not play any role in
the long-run, but rather the quantity corresponding to a walrasian equilibrium
is selected, i.e. a non-Nash outcome of the one-shot game.
In this paper, we examine the eﬀects of the introduction of memory in such
a framework. For the sake of tractability, we will work with a well-behaved
Cournot Oligopoly, as reﬂected by the following technical assumptions. A more
general analysis would add nothing to the understanding of the eﬀects of mem-
ory.
There are N  2 ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good whose demand is
given by the inverse-demand function P : R+ 7! R+. We assume this function
to be twice-diﬀerentiable in a closed interval [0;Qmax], downward-sloping (in
the diﬀerentiable sense: P0() < 0) and concave (P00()  0). Furthermore,
we assume that P(0) = Pmax > 0 and P(x) = 0 for all x  Qmax. All
ﬁrms have an identical cost function C : R+ 7! R+, assumed upward-sloping
(C0(x) > 0 8 x > 0) and strictly convex (C00() > 0).
Definition 2.1. The Walras quantity xW is such that P(NxW)xW C(xW) 
P(NxW)x  C(x) for all x.
Definition 2.2. The Cournot quantity xC is such that P(NxC)xC C(xC) 
P((N  1)xC + x)x  C(x) for all x.
We directly assume the existence of a unique, strictly positive Cournot quan-
tity xC and a unique, strictly positive Walras quantity xW.2
Time is discrete. Each period, ﬁrms are assumed to choose their output
from a common ﬁnite grid Γ = f0;;:::;vg; with arbitrary  > 0, thought to
be small, and v 2 N. Those quantities of interest will be assumed to be in the
grid (e.g. Walras and Cournot quantities).
2Existence of a positive Walras quantity is guaranteed under mild additional assumptions
(e.g. c0(0) < Pmax; otherwise the market is not meaningful), and then the assumptions above
guarantee its uniqueness. Those assumptions also guarantee the existence of a unique Cournot
quantity, and similarly mild conditions ensure it to be be non-zero.
3In the dynamics studied by Vega-Redondo (1997), ﬁrms observe the quanti-
ties produced and the proﬁts realized by all competitors, and then imitate the
quantities that led to the highest proﬁts. Independently across time and ﬁrms,
with a (small) probability " > 0, a ﬁrm will instead experiment with a randomly
chosen new quantity (all quantities in the grid having positive probability of be-
ing chosen). This event is called “a mutation.” The dynamics without mutations
is called “unperturbed.”
Formally, the model described is a ﬁnite Markov chain (for each ﬁxed ")
which can be studied using the by-now standard techniques brought into eco-
nomics by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) (see Kandori
and Rob (1995) or Ellison (2000) for other self-contained summaries). The ob-
jective is to ﬁnd the stochastically stable states, which are those in the support
of the limit invariant distribution of the process as the experimentation proba-
bility " goes to zero. The interpretation is that, for small ", in the long run the
process will spend most of the time on the stochastically stable states.
Given the quantities x1;:::;xN produced in a given period, the modeler (but









and hence the state space of the chain can be summarized by ΓN, in spite of
the fact that ﬁrms observe quantities and realized proﬁts.
Given a quantity x 2 Γ, denote mon(x) = (x;:::;x) 2 ΓN. Such states are
called monomorphic. The ﬁrst trivial observation is that the absorbing sets
of the unperturbed dynamics correspond to singletons formed by monomorphic
states (unsurprisingly, since the only force at work is imitation). It is then a stan-
dard result that only these states might be stochastically stable. Vega-Redondo
(1997) shows that, in the dynamics described above, the only stochastically sta-
ble state is mon(xW), i.e. the walrasian equilibrium. The key to this result is
the strong relative advantage that a ﬁrm producing xW gets. Speciﬁcally:
Lemma 2.3. For all x 6= xW;1  m  N,
P((N  m)x + mxW)xW  C(xW) > P((N  m)x + mxW)x  C(x)
Proof. See Vega-Redondo (1997, p.381). 
Taking m = N  1, we see that the Walras quantity features spite (see
e.g. Schaﬀer (1988) or Crawford (1991)): if a mutant deviates from the state
mon(xW), even to a best-response, the payoﬀs of the non-mutants, still choosing
xW, will rise even more than the mutant’s payoﬀ.
Taking m = 1, we see that the Walras quantity also features what we could
call negative spite (see Al´ os-Ferrer (2000)): if a mutant ﬁrm deviates to xW
from any monomorphic state, mon(x), with x 6= xW, even if its payoﬀs after
deviation have decreased, they will still be higher than those of the non-mutants.
For instance, suppose the economy is at the Cournot equilibrium, i.e. the state
mon(xC). If a mutant ﬁrm deviates to xW, its proﬁts will decrease, but the
proﬁts of the other ﬁrms will decrease even more. Hence, in absence of memory,
the mutation is successful.
4These two properties are enough to guarantee that mon(xW) is the only
stochastically stable state of the dynamics without memory. Intuitively, it is
much more probable to reach this state from any other than to leave it. In
the terms of Kandori and Rob (1995), the minimum-cost !-tree is constructed
connecting all states to mon(xW) with a single mutation (negative spite). Since
it is impossible to leave mon(xW) with a single mutation (spite), all the !-
trees of other states have strictly larger costs. In the terms of Ellison (2000),
mon(xW) has Coradius one by negative spite, and Radius larger than or equal
to two by spite.
2.2 Introducing memory
We want to investigate the eﬀects of the introduction of memory in this frame-
work. Assume that ﬁrms remember the quantities produced and the proﬁts
realized in the last K > 0 periods in addition to the present one (K = 0 is the
model without memory). Formally, the state space is enlarged to ΓN(K+1), and
the imitation rule simply speciﬁes to copy one of the quantities that has lead to
highest payoﬀs in the last K + 1 periods (including the present one).
The intuition is that, if ﬁrms remember past proﬁts, destabilizing Cournot
will not be such an easy task. After a single mutation from mon(xC), the mutant
may earn more than the non-mutants, but the largest payoﬀ remembered will
still be that of the Cournot equilibrium, and hence the mutant will “correct
the mistake,” even in absence of any strategic considerations. This allows us to
interpret the experimentation process as “trial-and-error”.3
Given a quantity x 2 Γ, denote mon(x;K) = ((x;:::;x);:::;(x;:::;x)), i.e. the
state where all ﬁrms have produced x for the last K + 1 periods. In the model
with memory, we call these states monomorphic.
Obviously, the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process are the single-
tons formed by monomorphic states. In the absence of mutation, the imitation
process can not lead away from a monomorphic state, and, given any non-
monomorphic state, there is always strictly positive probability that all ﬁrms
imitate the same quantity.4 This guarantees that the analysis can be restricted
to the monomorphic states. See e.g. Young (1993) or Ellison (2000).
3 Analysis
3.1 Relative advantage vs. absolute success
Two comparisons are of importance to consider the relative advantages of any
given quantity. The ﬁrst is the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between a mutant and the
non-mutants after a single mutation from a monomorphic state. This is given
3Vega-Redondo (1997) further assumes the presence of exogenous inertia, which has no
eﬀect there. This assumption, though, would eﬀectively prevent the analysis of memory by
enabling transitions where agents are “frozen” until the relevant payoﬀs are forgotten. See
Al´ os-Ferrer (2000) for a discussion.
4With memory, the argument is slightly more complex. Each of the following K + 1
periods, there is positive probability that all ﬁrms imitate the same quantity as other ﬁrms
(though not necessarily the same as in other periods). This leads to a state of the form
((x1;:::;x1);(x2;:::;x2);:::;(xK+1;:::;xK+1)). For the next K + 1 all of them imitate the
(remembered) quantity that yields higher proﬁts when all ﬁrms produce it.
5by:
D(x;y) = P((N  1)x + y)(y  x) + C(x)  C(y)
i.e. the diﬀerence, after mutation, between the payoﬀs of a mutant producing
y and the non-mutants, all of them still producing x. If D(x;y) > 0, then,
in a model without memory, a single mutation is enough for a transition from
mon(x) to mon(y). The spite of xW results from the fact that D(xW;y) < 0 for
all y 6= xW, and the negative spite amounts to D(x;xW) > 0 for all x 6= xW.
Both facts, which follow from Lemma 2.3, are illustrated in Figure 1.
y








Figure 1: D(x;y) is the payoﬀ diﬀerence between a mutant playing y and the
non-mutants playing x. If it is positive, the mutant fares better. The horizontal
axis is the second variable of D(;), i.e. the mutation y.
The second important comparison is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of a
mutant, producing y after mutation (from a monomorphic state where all ﬁrms
produce x) and the payoﬀ that the same mutant had before mutation, that is,
the absolute gain or loss due to the mutation:
M(x;y) = P((N  1)x + y)y  C(y)  P(N  x)x + C(x)
If M(x;y) > 0, then the mutant obtains, after deviation, higher proﬁts than be-
fore. The fact that the Cournot outcome is a (strict) Nash equilibrium translates
to M(xC;x) < 0 for all x 6= xC.
It is shown in Lemma A.3 (see Appendix A) that, under our assumptions,
M(x;xC) > 0 for all x 6= xC, which shows a certain analogy between the
Walras and Cournot quantities. The Walras quantity is such that deviations
to or from it always render a situation where relative payoﬀs are higher for the
ﬁrms producing xW after mutation. The Cournot quantity is such that single
deviations to or from it always render a situation where an “intertemporal”
6comparison between pre- and post-mutation payoﬀs for the mutant always favors
xC. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: M(x;y) is the payoﬀ diﬀerence experienced by a mutant deviating
from x to y, when all other ﬁrms remain playing x. If it is positive, the mutant is
better oﬀ. The horizontal axis is the second variable of M(;), i.e. the mutation
y.
The quantities D(x;1) and M(x;y) are not unrelated. In Lemma A.1, it is
shown that a deviation to a lower quantity (y < x) is always better in absolute
than in relative terms (i.e. M(x;y) > D(x;y)), whereas exactly the opposite is
true for deviations to higher quantities.
In a model with memory, both absolute and relative payoﬀ comparisons are
crucial. In the remaining analysis we see how this observation yields both the
Walras and the Cournot quantities as stable outcomes in the model detailed
above.
3.2 The stable set: quantities between Cournot and Wal-
ras
As a ﬁrst approximation, the following theorem shows that both quantities
above xW and below xC can be quickly discarded.
Theorem 3.1. For any K  1, the set of stochastically stable states is contained
in
fmon(x;K)=xC  x  xW;x 2 Γg
i.e. it is a subset of the set of monomorphic states corresponding to quantities
between (and including) the Cournot and the Walras ones. Moreover, mon(xW)
is always stochastically stable.
7Essentially, the proof (which is relegated to Appendix A) proceeds as follows.
From a monomorphic state, single mutations leave the mutant with higher after-
mutation proﬁts than those of the non-mutants only if the mutation happens in
the direction of xW (see Figure 1). Such mutations are thus successful in relative
terms, but not necessarily in absolute terms. Analogously, single mutations leave
the mutant with higher proﬁts than before only if the mutation happens in the
direction of xC (see Figure 2). Such mutations are thus successful in absolute
terms, but not necessarily in relative ones.
This is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts M(x;xW), M(x;xC), D(x;xW),
and D(x;xC). Whereas the walrasian quantity is guaranteed to represent an
advantage in relative, spiteful terms (due to Lemma 2.3), the Cournot quantity
is guaranteed to represent an advantage in absolute, intertemporal terms.
x
xC xW
M(x;xC) D(x;xW) D(x;xC) M(x;xW)
Figure 3: Deviations to Cournot and Walras. A mutant from x to y = xC or
xW gains in relative terms if and only if D(x;y) > 0. He gains in absolute terms
if and only if M(x;y) > 0. The horizontal axis is here the ﬁrst variable of the
functions D(;) and M(;).
Quantities below xC are unstable, because a mutation to a higher quantity
(e.g. xC) can go simultaneously in the direction of xC and xW. A single mu-
tant, hence, will earn more payoﬀs than the non-mutants both after and before
mutation, and will be imitated. The same holds for quantities above xW are un-
stable, because a mutation to a lower quantity (e.g. xW) can go simultaneously
in the direction of xW and xC.
It turns out, though, that quantities in [xC;xW] are more stable. More
precisely, no single mutation form the corresponding monomorphic state can
be successful. This fact is established in Lemma A.6. The argument (which is
8partially reﬂected in Figure 3), is as follows.
Consider any quantity x 2 [xC;xW]. A mutation from mon(x;K) “up-
wards,” towards a higher quantity (e.g. xW) might leave the mutant with
higher after-mutation proﬁts than the non-mutants (e.g., D(x;xW) > 0, see
Figure 3). Still, before-mutation proﬁts are the highest proﬁts remembered
(e.g., M(x;xW) < 0. Hence, the mutation would not be successful. A mutation
“downwards,” towards a lower quantity (e.g. xC) might leave the mutant with
higher payoﬀs than before mutation (e.g., M(x;xC) > 0). The largest pay-
oﬀ observed, though, would be that of the non-mutants (after mutation) (e.g.,
D(x;xC) < 0). Hence, such a mutation would also be unsuccessful. In sum-
mary, a single mutation from a state where all ﬁrms produce x 2 [xC;xW] will
never be successful (this is proven in Lemma A.6), whereas a single mutation
is enough to destabilize all other states (Lemmata A.4 and A.5). This reﬂects
a diﬀerent level of stability and is enough to drive the result: all stochastically
stable states must be monomorphic states corresponding to quantities between
the Cournot and the Walras ones.
Remark 3.2. The arguments above imply that, in the terminology of Ellison
(2000), the set fmon(x;K)=xC  x  xW;x 2 Γg has Radius strictly larger
than one, but Coradius 1. Theorem 1 in Ellison (2000) then yields an alternative
proof of the result, and additionally implies that the estimated time of ﬁrst
arrival into the mentioned set is of order "1, that is, convergence is as fast as
it can be, and independent of population size.
Theorem 3.1 also states that the walrasian quantity is always stochastically
stable. The essence of the proof is the following. Starting from a quantity
x 2 [xC;xW), it is always possible to move upwards from mon(x;K) to mon(x+
;K), where x < x +   xW, with two simultaneous mutations. For example,
from mon(x;K), consider two simultaneous mutations to quantities x   and
x + . This leaves the total produced quantity, and hence the market price
p = P(N  X), unchanged. With a ﬁxed price, though, the proﬁt function
p  x  C(x) is concave and attains its maximum above xW (see Lemma A.7).
Hence, the mutant producing x +  earns larger proﬁts than the non-mutants
(both before and after mutation), and than the mutant producing x. Thus,
x +  is imitated.
Repeating this argument, we can construct a chain that connects mon(x;K)
with x 2 [xC;xW) to mon(xW;K), where each transition is done with exactly
two mutations. In the terminology of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), this
is enough to build the mon(xW;K)-tree of minimal cost.
3.3 The duopoly case
Theorem 3.1 shows that the Cournot quantity and the Walras one are respec-
tively the lower and upper bound of the quantities that can be observed in the
market in the long run. Quantities that are too low (respectively too high) are
promptly destabilized because deviations to higher (respectively lower) quanti-
ties are made both in the direction of the Cournot quantity and the Walras one.
Hence, the result makes use of two powerful forces. The ﬁrst force is the one
associated to Nash equilibria, reinterpreted as an intertemporal comparison of
own payoﬀs. The second, the already familiar eﬀects of spite and negative spite.
Between xC and xW, these two forces clash. We see now a ﬁrst case where
9the outcome is “undecided” and their clash stabilizes the whole interval of quan-
tities: the duopoly.
Proposition 3.3. If N = 2 (a duopoly), and for any K  1, the set of stochas-
tically stable states is identically equal to
fmon(x;K)=xC  x  xW;x 2 Γg
i.e. it is formed by all the monomorphic states corresponding to quantities be-
tween (and including) the Cournot and the Walras ones.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. The result relies on the fact that, with
a population of just two ﬁrms, after two simultaneous mutations to the same
quantity there are no relative-payoﬀ considerations, because there are no non-
mutants left. If only absolute-payoﬀ considerations are present, mutations in the
direction of xC are again successful. This allows to construct transitions “down-
wards” from monomorphic states corresponding to quantities x 2 (xC;xW] with
two mutations. This implies that, within [xC;xW], it is just as costly (in terms
of mutations) to move up or downwards. Upwards transitions are as mentioned
above for the mon(xW;K)-tree of minimal cost. Downwards transitions use two
simultaneous mutations to the same (smaller) quantity.
Thus, we know that, although the walrasian quantity is always contained
in the prediction, it will in general not be the only quantity there, as in Vega-
Redondo (1997). Moreover, the Cournot quantity might be in the prediction.
3.4 The general case with more than two ﬁrms
We concentrate now on N  3 (since the case N = 2 is solved by Proposition
3.3). We will conclude that the whole interval [xC;xW] is also stable in this
case, although the required construction to prove this result is not as simple as
in the duopoly case.
We know from Theorem 3.1 that the walrasian outcome is stochastically
stable, and that the only other candidates for stochastic stability are the states
mon(x;K) with x 2 [xC;xW]. The key to establish that all these states are
indeed stable is that it is possible to destabilize Walras with the same cost (in
terms of mutations) as any other quantity in [xC;xW].
We need to consider transitions leaving mon(xW;K). This cannot be accom-
plished with one single mutation, but it is easy to see that two mutations would
suﬃce. To get an intuition of how, we consider an extreme example. Let, for
instance, xW
N1 > xW be the Walras quantity when there are only N  1 ﬁrms
in the market. Suppose two mutant ﬁrms produce respectively 0 and xW
N1. In
all practical respects, the situation is as if there were only N  1 ﬁrms in the
market, and the one that now produces xW
N1 earns larger proﬁts than the rest
by Lemma 2.3. But these ﬁrms are earning more than before mutation, since
their costs remain the same and the price has risen (xW
N1 is easily seen to be
lower than 2xW). In summary, the ﬁrm that has deviated to xW
N1 is better oﬀ
both in relative and absolute terms, and hence the transition to mon(xW
N1;K)
follows.
Once a transition to a larger quantity has been achieved with two mutations,
the system is in the unstable region out of [xC;xW]. The new monomorphic
state can be destabilized by a single mutation to a lower quantity, and it can
10be computed that quantities strictly lower than xW can be reached now in such
a way. Consider one such quantity, x0 with xC  x0 < xW. This shows that
mon(x0;K) must be stochastically stable. Consider the mon(xW;K)-tree which
shows stability of Walras. Add the two transitions discussed above, with a total
cost of three. In exchange, the previous transitions leaving mon(xW
N1) (at cost
one) and mon(x0;K) (at cost two) can be deleted, yielding for the new tree (with
vertex mon(x0;K)) the same cost as that of the original mon(xW;K)-tree.
It turns out that transitions such as these can be used to show stability of
the whole spectrum of quantities in [xC;xW], as the next theorem states. The
detailed proof is relegated to Appendix B. It is noteworthy that, in this case,
it is enough to add a single period of memory to alter the conclusions of the
model without memory.
Theorem 3.4. For any K  1, N > 2, and  small enough, the set of stochas-
tically stable states is
fmon(x;K)=xC  x  xW;x 2 Γg
i.e. all the monomorphic states corresponding to quantities between the Cournot
and the Walras ones.
An example of the procedure used to show stability of non-walrasian quan-
tities is illustrated in Figure 4 (based on quadratic costs and linear demand).
At the state mon(xW;K), consider two mutations to quantities 0 and x with
xW < x < 2  x. Let H(x) be the after-mutation payoﬀ diﬀerence between the
xmutant and the incumbents. As long as H(x) is positive, the xmutant is
successful. The function H(x) is easily seen to be strictly concave, which yields
a range of monomorphic states, corresponding to quantities above xW, which
can be reached from mon(xW;K) with just two mutations. But from each of
these states, a single mutation to lower quantities y is successful as long as
D(x;y)  0. If it happens, for instance, that D(x;xC) is positive, the stability
of mon(xC;K) follows.
4 Discussion
The presence of memory allows agents to behave as if they were able to “ex-
periment conditionally.” When a new strategy is tried out, memory allows to
compare its success with that of the previous strategy. If the mutation brings
payoﬀs down, the mutant will be able to “correct” the mistake and go back to
the previous action. This observation, which is of intertemporal nature in an
explicitly dynamic framework, naturally reintroduces better-response consider-
ations into models of bounded rationality without explicitly assuming that the
agents compute any best reply. However, the example analyzed in this paper
shows that this is not the only consideration. It is the interplay between better
response (to do better than yesterday) and relative success (to do better than
the others) which creates a rich dynamic in which two properties arise as deter-
mining the long-run outcomes. The ﬁrst property is the one associated to Nash
equilibria, reinterpreted as an intertemporal comparison of own payoﬀs. The
second, the already familiar eﬀects of spite and negative spite.
In the case of a Cournot Oligopoly, we see the two forces clash, giving us
an economically meaningful example where two focal points are selected: the





Figure 4: How to leave Walras. A transition from mon(xW;K) to mon(x;K),
x > xW can be achieved with two mutations if and only if H(x)  0. A
transition from mon(xi;K) to mon(y;K) (e.g. y = xC) can be achieved with
one mutation if D(xi;y)  0. The horizontal axis is the second variable of D(;)
and the argument of H().
ﬁrst thanks to its Nash-equilibrium condition, the second thanks to its spiteful
properties. As these two “forces” compete, the whole interval between those
two outcomes is stabilized, creating an apparently blunt prediction. In actual
examples, the prediction reduces to a small interval of quantities (necessarily
shrinking for large number of ﬁrms), not unlike the interval of prices found in
Al´ os-Ferrer, Ania, and Schenk-Hopp´ e (2000) for the Bertrand model. However,
the fact that it is still an interval appropriately illustrates both the stability
properties of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and of the spite-driven walrasian
outcome.
From the point of view of Industrial Organization, this paper shows the lack
of stability of quantities above the Walras one, and below the Cournot one.
It shows that both of them play a clear role, limiting the interval of stable
quantities, but neither of them is to be expected as a unique solution.
Since the stochastic analysis relies on identifying the less costly, i.e. more
probable transitions, it is tempting to re-interpret the arguments in the proofs
of the main result as pointing at high-probability paths. Under such an (admit-
tedly risky) interpretation, it is clear that we would rarely observe quantities
outside the interval limited by the Cournot and Walras quantities. We would
rather observe a dynamic, almost-cyclical behavior. Once the market settles in
a given quantity, slowly some ﬁrms will deviate from it, both to lower and higher
quantities, but only the ones with higher quantities will be successful, due to
spite-driven considerations. This process will keep raising the market quantity
until some ﬁrm will raise it too much, above the walrasian one, enjoying a short-
lived prosperity which will be quickly undermined by other ﬁrms switching to
much lower quantities. From these lower quantities, the “cycle” will start again.
12A Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof proceeds through a series of lemmata, some of which will also be
useful for the proof of Theorem 3.4.
First, recall that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process are the
monomorphic states. Thus, we can concentrate the analysis on them (see e.g.
Young (1993) or Ellison (2000)).
Lemma A.1. M(x;y) > D(x;y) 8 y < x;M(x;y) < D(x;y) 8 y > x
Proof. Notice that M(x;y) = D(x;y) + x  [P((N  1)x + y)  P(N  x)]. If
y < x, then (N  1)x + y < N  x. Since P is strictly decreasing, this implies
that P((N  1)x + y)  P(N  x) > 0, proving the claim. If y > x, the proof
proceeds analogously. 
Lemma A.2. For any x, M(x;) is a strictly concave function. Deﬁne yM(x) =
argmaxfM(x;y)=0  y  Qmaxg. Then, yM(x) is continuous and decreasing.
Moreover, there exists QM > xC such that yM(x) is diﬀerentiable and strictly
decreasing in (0;QM) and yM(x) = 0 for all x 2 [QM;Qmax].
Proof. For a given, ﬁxed x, the function M(x;y) is strictly concave in y:
@2M(x;y)
@y2 = P00((N  1)x + y)y + 2P0((N  1)x + y)  C00(y) < 0
Hence, the ﬁrst order condition
@M(x;y)
@y
= P0((N  1)x + y)y + P((N  1)x + y)  C0(y) = 0
is necessary and suﬃcient for an interior global maximum.
The function yM is continuous by the Maximum Theorem. For all x, we have
that M(x;Qmax) = C(Qmax)P(Nx)x+C(x) < C(0)P(Nx)x+C(x) =
M(x;0) for all x. It follows that yM(x) < Qmax. That is, either yM(x) = 0 or
it is an interior solution (0 < yM(x) < Qmax).
In the sub-domain where it is strictly positive, yM(x) is implicitly deﬁned by
the ﬁrst order condition above. By the Implicit Function Theorem, this function









Hence, yM(x) is strictly decreasing in this set, and equal to zero outside it.
Continuity of yM(x) in its whole domain and the fact that yM(xC) = xC > 0
complete the claim. 
Lemma A.3. M(x;xC) > 0 for all x 6= xC
Proof. Notice that yM(xC) = xC. From Lemma A.2, it follows that, for all
x < xC, yM(x) > xC > x. Analogously, for all x > xC, yM(x) < xC < x.
In both cases, since M(x;x) = 0, M(x;) is strictly concave, and yM(x) is its
maximum, we have that M(x;xC) > 0. 
Lemma A.4. For any x < xC, a single mutation suﬃces for the transition
from mon(x;K) to mon(xC;K).
13Proof. Starting at mon(x;K), suppose one mutant ﬁrm deviates to xC. By
Lemma A.3, M(x;xC) > 0; i.e. the mutant attains higher payoﬀs than all ﬁrms
before mutation, when all produced x. By Lemma A.1, D(x;xC) > M(x;xC) >
0; i.e. the mutant also attains higher payoﬀs than the non-mutants after muta-
tion. Since the mutant’s is the highest observed payoﬀ, the mutation is successful
and the transition to mon(xC;K) is completed after K consecutive periods. 
Lemma A.5. For any x > xW, a single mutation suﬃces for the transition
from mon(x;K) to mon(xW;K).
Proof. Starting at mon(x;K), suppose one mutant ﬁrm deviates to xW. By
Lemma 2.3, D(x;xW) > 0; i.e. the mutant attains higher payoﬀs than the non-
mutants after mutation. By Lemma A.1, M(x;xW) > D(x;xW) > 0; i.e. the
mutant also attains higher payoﬀs than the all ﬁrms before mutation, when all
produced x. Since the mutant’s is the highest observed payoﬀ, the mutation is
successful and the transition to mon(xC;K) is completed after K consecutive
periods. 
Lemma A.6. No state mon(x;K) with xC  x  xW can be destabilized with
only one mutation.
Proof. Consider a mutation to y > x. By Lemma A.2, M(x;) is strictly con-
cave. Moreover, since x  xC, it follows that yM(x)  yM(xC) = xC  x, and
hence M(x;) is decreasing in [x;Qmax]. In particular, M(x;y) < M(x;x) = 0,
i.e., after a single mutation to y > x, the mutant will obtain smaller proﬁts than
before. It follows that the process will simply go back to mon(x;K) in absence
of further mutations.
Consider now a mutation to y < x. Analogously, suppose that D(x;) is
increasing in [0;x]. Then, D(x;y) < D(x;x) = 0 for y < x, i.e. the mutant
obtains smaller proﬁts than the non-mutants after a single mutation to y < x.
It follows that the process will go back to mon(x;K) in absence of further
mutations.
It remains to show that, for xC  x  xW, D(x;) is increasing in [0;x].
The ﬁrst derivative is
@D
@y
= P0((N  1)x + y)(y  x) + P((N  1)x + y)  C0(y)
and we will show that it is strictly positive in [0;x), therefore proving the claim.
Since P0() < 0 and y < x, the ﬁrst part of the expression is strictly positive. For
the second part, notice that the function P(N  z)  C0(z) is strictly decreasing
in z and has a zero at z = xW.5 Then, since x  xW, we have that P(N  x) 
C0(x). Since y < x, it follows that P((N 1)x+y) > P(N x)  C0(x) > C0(y),
completing the proof. 
Lemma A.7. For p 2 [0;Pmax], the function gp(z) = p  z  C(z) is strictly
concave in z, and it attains a unique maximum z(p). The function z(p) is
increasing and z(P(N  xW)) = xW.
5The ﬁrst derivative is N  P0(N  z)  C00(z) < 0. The walrasian quantity xW is a zero of
this function by deﬁnition.
14Proof. The second derivative of gp is simply C00(z) < 0, proving strict con-
cavity and the existence of a unique maximum in the compact set [0;Qmax].
Moreover, z(p) is continuous by the Maximum Theorem, and, for every p, ei-
ther z(p) is an interior maximum, or z(p) 2 f0;Qmaxg. The ﬁrst order condition
for an interior maximum is p = C0(z), i.e. z(p) = [C0]1(p). This function is
strictly increasing because C0 is strictly increasing. Hence, the function z must
be increasing by continuity. Finally, z(P(N  xW)) = xW follows by deﬁnition.

Lemma A.8. For all xC  x  xW , two mutations suﬃce for the transition
from mon(x;K) to mon(x + ;K) to occur.
Proof. Consider the situation mon(x;K), where all ﬁrms are producing a quan-
tity x and selling it at a price P = P(N  x). Consider two simultaneous
mutations of the following type. One ﬁrm deviates to x + , and another ﬁrm
deviates to x  . The market price in the new situation, (x + ;x  ;x;:::;x),
is P(x +  + x   + (N  2)  x) = P(N  x) = P.
Since z(p) is increasing by Lemma A.7, P = P(N  x) > P(N  xW) implies
that z(P)  z(P(N  xW)) = xW. Since the function gP(z) is strictly concave
and has a maximum at z(P), this implies that it is strictly increasing on [0;xW],
and, in particular, P (x+)C(x+) > P (x)C(x) > P (x)C(x).
Hence, after the two mutations described above, the mutant producing x+ not
only earns more proﬁts than the non-mutants, but also higher ones than any
proﬁts in the previous periods, implying that the transition to mon(x + ;K)
will be successfully completed. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We have to show that the monomorphic state mon(xW;K)
is stochastically stable, and that no monomorphic state mon(x;K) with x = 2
[xC;xW] can be stochastically stable.
Call n1 the number of quantities in [xC;xW]
T
Γ, and n2 the number of
quantities in Γn[xC;xW].
Consider any !-tree. Stochastically stable states are those with minimal-
cost !-trees (see e.g. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) or Ellison (2000) . In
any such tree, the cost necessary to leave any state but the vertex is two for
monomorphic states corresponding to quantities in [xC;xW]
T
Γ (by Lemmata
A.6 and A.8), and at least one for all others (because monomorphic states can
not be destabilized without mutation). If we are able to construct an !-tree
such that
1. The vertex ! corresponds to a state mon(z;K) with z 2 [xC;xW]
T
Γ
2. For all other x 2 [xC;xW]
T
Γ, the state mon(x;K) is connected at cost
two.
3. For all x 2 Γn[xC;xW], the state mon(x;K) is connected at cost one.
then this would show that the state ! is stochastically stable. The cost of this
tree would be 2  (n1  1) + n2 = 2  n1  2 + n2. Moreover, it follows that the
stochastically stable states are exactly those having !-trees of this cost.
We construct now such a tree with vertex mon(xW;K).
For all x < xC;x 2 Γ, the state mon(x;K) is connected at cost one to
mon(xC;K), by Lemma A.4.
15For all x > xW;x 2 Γ, the state mon(x;K) is connected at cost one to
mon(xW;K), by Lemma A.5.
For all x 2 [xC;xW)
T
Γ, the state mon(x;K) is connected at cost two to
mon(x + ;K).
This completes a mon(xW;K)-tree of the desired cost. Hence, mon(xW;K)
is stochastically stable.
Consider any quantity x 2 Γn[xC;xW]. The minimum cost that could be
attained by any mon(x;K)-tree is at least 2n1 +n2 1 by Lemma A.6, which
is larger than required. This proves that mon(x;K) is not stochastically stable.

Proof of Proposition 3.3. If N = 2, then the state mon(x;K) can be connected
to the state mon(x;K) with two mutations (both to x) for all x > xC;x 2
Γ. This follows from the fact that the function P(2  x)  x  C(x) is strictly
concave and its maximum, that is, the collusion output, is lower than xC.
For any x 2 [xC;xW)
T
Γ, consider the mon(xW;K)-tree constructed in the
proof of the Theorem 3.1. Consider all the arrows leaving states mon(x0;K) for
x0 2 [x;xW)
T
Γ. These arrows, which connected mon(x0;K) to mon(x0 +;K)
with two mutations, can be reversed so that they connect now mon(x0+;K) to
mon(x0;K), also with two mutations. This procedure yields a mon(x;K)-tree
of minimal cost, which, together with Theorem 3.1, proves the result. 
B Proof of Theorem 3.4
In this section, let N  3. The proof of the main Theorem consists of a series
of interrelated, often technical lemmata.
We already know that the stochastically stable states must be contained in
the set of monomorphic states corresponding to quantities in [xC;xW], and that
mon(xW;K) is stochastically stable. To prove Theorem 3.4, we have to build
mon(x;K)-trees (with x 2 [xC;xW)) with the same cost (in terms of mutations)
as the mon(xW;K)-tree built in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We will see that,
for this purpose, it is enough to modify the mentioned mon(xW;K)-tree, by
deleting certain arrows and adding transitions from higher to lower quantities.
This will show stochastic stability of the whole interval. The ﬁrst Lemma,
though, establishes that this cannot be done with “direct” transitions.
Lemma B.1. Let x 2 [xC;xW]. No transition from mon(x;K) to mon(x0;K)
with x0 < x is possible with two mutations or less.
Proof. Transitions with one mutation are precluded by Lemma A.6. It suﬃces,
hence, to consider two simultaneous mutations to x0;x00 with x0 < x.
Recall that, by Lemma A.7, the proﬁt function gp(z) = pzC(z) is strictly
concave and its unique maximum z(p) is increasing in p, with z(P(N  xW)) =
xW.
Let Q = (N  2)x + x0 + x00 be the total quantity produced after mutation,
and let p = P(Q) be the corresponding market price.
If Q < NxW, then p > P(NxW) and hence z(p)  xW. It follows that
gp(x0) < gp(x), i.e. the x0-mutant earns less than the non-mutants after mutation
(remember that N  3), and hence can not be successful.
16If Q > NxW, then p < P(NxW) < P(Nx) and p  x0  C(x0) < P(Nx)x0 
C(x0). Since z(P(Nx))  xW, it follows that P(Nx)x0  C(x0) < P(Nx)x 
C(x). Combining both facts, we get that p  x0  C(x0) < P(Nx)x  C(x), i.e.
the x0-mutant earns less than the non-mutants before mutation and hence can
not be successful. 
Since transitions to lower quantities can not be achieved directly with two
mutations, we must take a detour. The basic idea is that quantities in [xC;xW]
can be ﬁrst destabilized “upwards,” to high quantities above xW from where
we can add further transitions reaching lower quantities than the original ones.
The next two lemmata concentrate on the ﬁrst step in such transitions, giving
us a range of higher quantities that we can reach from a given one (actually,
from the corresponding monomorphic state).
Lemma B.2. Let x 2 [xC;xW].6 A transition from mon(x;K) to mon(y;K),
with x < y  2  x can be achieved with two mutations if H(x;y)  0, where
H(x;y) = P(y + 0 + (N  2)  x)(y  x)  C(y) + C(x):
Proof. Consider the situation mon(x;K), where all ﬁrms are producing the
quantity x. Consider two simultaneous mutations to quantities x1 = y;x2 = 0,
with x < y  2  x. Call then Q = y + (N  2)  x  N  x.
Note that P(Q)xC(x)  P(N x)xC(x). It follows that the considered
mutation can be successful if and only if P(Q)y  C(y)  P(Q)x  C(x), i.e. if
and only if
H(x;y) = P(y + 0 + (N  2)  x)(y  x)  C(y) + C(x)
is positive.7 
Fix x and denote Hx(y) = H(x;y). Note that Hx(x) = 0 and that H0
x(x) =
P((N  1)  x)  C0(x) > P(N  x)  C0(x)  0 (since x  xW). This proves
that for y > x close enough to x, such a transition is possible. The problem
is whether the transition is also possible for y > x “far away enough” for our
purposes.
Lemma B.3. For x 2 [xC;xW], deﬁne
h(x) = maxfy 2 [x;2  x]jH(x;y)  0g
Then, h is continuous, and either h(x) = 2x, or h(x) 2 (x;2  x). In the latter
case, h(x) is implicitly deﬁned by H(x;h(x)) = 0, and it is strictly decreasing.8
6This Lemma holds actually for a larger range of quantities.
7The considered mutations (involving a mutant to quantity zero) might seem arbitrary.
Actually, a transition from mon(x;K) to mon(y;K) through two mutations to x1 = y;x2  0
(such that x1 > x;x1+x2  2x) is possible if and only if the same transition can be achieved
with two mutations to x1 and x0
2 = 0.
To prove this, ﬁrst note that if the transition is possible with the mutations to x1;x2, then
P(x1 +x2 +(N 2)x)(x1 x)C(x1)+C(x)  0 which, since P is decreasing, implies that
P(x1 + 0 + (N  2)  x)(x1  x)  C(x1) + C(x)  0 which in turn implies the claim.
The reverse implication is trivial. It suﬃces to set x2 = 0.
8Hence, h is either decreasing or “tent-shaped,” because 2x is increasing and the implicit
function deﬁned by H(x;h(x)) = 0 is decreasing.
17Proof. Fix x and denote Hx(y) = H(x;y). Then,
H0
x(y) = P0(y + (N  2)x)(y  x) + P(y + (N  2)x)  C0(y)
H00
x(y) = P00(y + (N  2)x)(y  x) + 2P0(y + (N  2)x)  C00(x) < 0
and hence Hx is strictly concave. It follows that the set
Kx = fy 2 [x;2  x]jH(x;y)  0g
is convex, and the correspondence x 7! Kx is continuous and compact-valued,
so h(x) is continuous (e.g. by an application of the Maximum Theorem to the
identity function y 7! y), and Kx = [x;h(x)] (by concavity). Moreover,
H0
x(x) = P((N  1)x)  C0(x) > P(N  x)  C0(x)  0
since x  xW, and hence h(x) > x. Hence, either h(x) is in the interior of the
interval (and then, by continuity, H(x;h(x)) = 0), or h(x) = 2x.
It remains to show that h(x) is strictly decreasing whenever H(x;h(x)) = 0.
By the Implicit Function Theorem, in this case the function h(x) is diﬀerentiable










Since Hx is strictly concave and Hx(x) = Hx(h(x)) = 0, with h(x) > x, it
follows that H0
x(h(x)) < 0. By direct computation,
@H(x;y)
@x




= (N  2)P 0((N  2)x + h(x))(h(x)  x)  P((N  2)x + h(x)) + C0(x)
We claim this last quantity to be negative. Notice that P0() < 0 and
(h(x)x) > 0, hence the ﬁrst part is negative. For the second part, notice that
from H(x;h(x)) = 0 follows that
P((N  2)x + h(x)) =
C(h(x))  C(x)
h(x)  x
and this quantity is strictly larger than C0(x) by strict convexity of C.9 Hence,
the second part is also negative. In summary, h0(x) < 0. 
The next lemma paves the way for the second step in the transitions ex-
plained above. Once we have reached a monomorphic state with a certain high
quantity, we need to determine how far “down” we can go back. We are only
interested in reaching quantities in [xC;xW]. Intuitively, we can concentrate
on the relative advantages of mutants because they adjust their quantity in the
direction of xC and are hence better oﬀ in absolute terms. More rigorously,
Lemma A.1 implies that a mutation from a higher to a lower quantity is al-
ways beneﬁcial in absolute terms when it is so in relative terms. Therefore, we
concentrate on the function D(x;).




h(x)x > C0(x) since C00() > 0.
18Lemma B.4. For x > xW, deﬁne
f(x) = minfy 2 [0;x]jD(x;y)  0g:
Then, f is continuous, and either f(x) = 0 or f(x) 2 (0;xW). In the latter
case, f is implicitly deﬁned by D(x;f(x)) = 0, and it is strictly decreasing.
Moreover, D(x;y) > 0 for all y 2 (f(x);x).
Proof. Consider Dx(y) = D(x;y) = P((N 1)x+y)(yx)+C(x)C(y). Note
that Dx(x) = 0 and
D0
x(y) = P0((N  1)x + y)(y  x) + P((N  1)x + y)  C0(y)
and hence D0
x(x) = P(Nx)  C0(x) < 0 for x > xW. Hence, Dx(y) > 0 for
y < x close enough to x.
If Dx(y)  0 for all y 2 (0;x) then the claim is true with f(x) = 0. If not,
then there exists x0 2 (0;x) such that D(x;x0) = 0.
It is enough to show that, if D(x;x0) = 0, then D(x;y) > 0 for all y 2 (x0;x).
This implies that there cannot exist two diﬀerent quantities x0;x00 2 (0;x) with
D(x;x0) = 0 and D(x;x00) = 0 and, by continuity of D, proves the claim.
Suppose, then, D(x;x0) = 0. Call P 0 = P((N  1)x + x0). We have that
P0  x0  C(x0) = P0  x  C(x)
Since the function given by gP 0(z) = P0 z C(z) is strictly concave by Lemma
A.7, it follows that P0  y  C(y) > P 0  x  C(x) for all y 2 (x0;x).
Consider any y 2 (x0;x). Since y > x0, we have that P((N  1)x + y) <
P((N  1)x + x0) = P0. Since y < x, it follows that P((N  1)x + y)(y  x) >
P0  (y  x) and hence
D(x;y) = P((N 1)x+y)(yx)C(y)+C(x) > P 0(yx)C(y)+C(x) > 0
as needed.
Note that, by Lemma 2.3, D(x;xW) > 0, which implies that f(x) < xW.
It remains to show that f is continuous for x > xW. This follows from the
Maximum Theorem since f(x) is the argmin of the identity function in the set
K0
x = fy=D(x;y)  0g. We have shown that this set is a closed interval (compact
and convex) for all x > xW (and we can deﬁne K0
xW = fxWg), and we know that
D(;) is a continuous function, hence continuity of the correspondence x 7! K0
x
follows.
In the sub-domain where it is strictly positive, f(x) is implicitly deﬁned by
D(x;f(x)) = 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem, this function is diﬀeren-










By deﬁnition of f(x) and continuity, it follows that D0








= (N  1)P0((N  1)x + f(x))(f(x)  x)  P((N  1)x + f(x)) + C0(x)
19We claim this last quantity to be positive. Notice that P0() < 0 and (f(x) 
x) < 0, hence the ﬁrst part is positive. For the second part, notice that from
D(x;f(x)) = 0 follows that
P((N  1)x + f(x)) =
C(x)  C(f(x))
x  f(x)
and this quantity is strictly lower than C0(x) by strict convexity of C.10 This
implies the second part to be also positive.
In summary, f is a strictly decreasing function in the set where it is implicitly
deﬁned by D(x;f(x)) = 0, and zero outside it. By continuity, f is decreasing
in its whole domain. 
For high quantities (above xW), mutations to lower ones are beneﬁcial in
relative terms. Last lemma shows that, as we consider higher and higher quan-
tities, the range of such beneﬁcial deviations increases in size. In the next
result we tackle a complementary consideration. Fixing a deviation y, we show
that there exists a quantity (y) such that the deviation y is beneﬁcial for all
monomorphic states corresponding to quantities above (y).
Lemma B.5. The function D(x;y) is strictly convex in x for x > y. For
all y < xW there exists a unique (y) > xW such that D((y);y) = 0 and
D(x;y) > 0 8 x > (y). Taking (xW) = xW, the function  is continuous in
(0;xW].11
In particular, if x2 > x1 > y and D(x1;y)  0, then D(x2;y) > 0.




@x computed in the proof of Lemma B.4, and
d00
y(x) = (N 1)2P 00((N1)x+y)(yx)2(N1)P0((N1)x+y)+C00(x) > 0
i.e. D(x;y) is strictly convex in x for x > y.
Let y < xW. Note that d0
y(y) = P(N  y) + C0(y). Since the function
P(N z)C0(z) is strictly decreasing in z and has a zero at xW (see footnote 5
in Lemma A.6), it follows that d0
y(y) < 0. Noting that dy(Qmax) = C(Qmax) 
C(y) > 0, it follows that there exists (y) 2 (y;Qmax) such that dy((y)) = 0
and dy(x) > 0 8 x > (y). Since D(xW;y) < 0 by Lemma 2.3, necessarily
(y) > xW.
Continuity of  follows from convexity of D(;y) analogously to Lemmata
B.3 and B.4.
In particular, consider x2 > x1 > y such that dy(x1) = D(x1;y)  0.
Since dy(y) = D(y;y) = 0, it follows from convexity that dy(x) is increasing
for x > x1 (since, if dy has a minimum, it must be lower than x1). Hence,
D(x2;y)  D(x1;y)  0. 
Suppose that a monomorphic state mon(x;K) with x 2 [xC;xW] has been
destabilized with two mutations and a new state mon(x0;K) has been reached.




f(x)x < C0(x) since C00() > 0 and (f(x)  x) < 0.
11It is easy to see that the functions f and  are partial inverses, i.e. f((x)) = x for all
x 2 [0;xW], but (f(x)) 6= x in general (f is not invertible).
20Lemma B.3 guarantees that this is possible for all x0 2 (x;h(x)]. The next
Lemma implies that, if x0 is high enough, it must be the case that D(x0;x) is
strictly positive, and hence, from the new state mon(x0;K), a single mutation
back to x or, by continuity, to an even lower quantity, will be beneﬁcial in
relative terms. This will be the core of the argument to show how to “go back”
and construct transitions towards lower quantities in [xC;xW] (recall that we
already know that mon(xW;K) is stochastically stable).
Lemma B.6. Let x 2 [xC;xW]. Then, D(h(x);x) > 0. Moreover, h(x) > xW.
Proof. By Lemma B.3, either h(x) 2 (x;2x), or h(x) = 2x. We distinguish both
cases. If h(x) 2 (x;2x), again by Lemma B.3, we have that H(x;h(x)) = 0, i.e.
P(h(x) + (N  2)x)(h(x)  x) = C(h(x))  C(x):
Then,
D(h(x);x) = P((N  1)h(x) + x)(x  h(x))  C(x) + C(h(x)) =
[P(h(x) + (N  2)x)  P((N  1)h(x) + x)]  (h(x)  x)
Since h(x) > x, it follows that h(x) + (N  2)x < (N  1)h(x) + x, thus
P(h(x) + (N  2)x) > P((N  1)h(x) + x)
implying D(h(x);x) > 0.
Suppose now that h(x) = 2x. Then,
D(2x;x) = P((N  1)2x + x)(x  2x)  C(x) + C(2x)
Let p = P((N  1)2x + x) = P((2N  1)x). Since N > 2, p < P((N + 1)x).
Taking a Taylor expansion,
P((N + 1)x) = P(Nx) + P 0(Nx)x +
1
2
P 00(x)x2  P(Nx) + P 0(Nx)x  C0(x)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from P 00()  0, and the second from the fact
that x  xC.12 Hence, p < C0(x).
Recall that, by Lemma A.7, gp(z) = p  z  C(z) is strictly concave and
attains a maximum at z(p). Since p < C0(x), it follows that g0
p(x) < 0 and
z(p)  x, implying that gp is strictly decreasing for z  x. In particular,
D(2x;x) = p(x  2x)  C(x) + C(2x) = gp(x)  gp(2x) > 0
which proves the claim.
It remains to prove that h(x) > xW. Suppose otherwise. Then, by Lemma
B.5, D(h(x);x) > 0 implies that D(xW;x) > 0, a contradiction with Lemma
2.3. 
The next lemma implies that, given any quantity x 2 [xC;xW], there exists
a range of higher quantities y such that the corresponding monomorphic states
can be reached from mon(x;K) with two mutations as in Lemma B.2, but new
monomorphic states mon(x0;K) with x0 < x can be reached from mon(y;K)
with a single mutation (see Figure 5).
12The function P(Nx) + P0(Nx)x  C0(x) is strictly decreasing and has a unique zero at
x = xC.
21Lemma B.7. For all x 2 [xC;xW], (x) < h(x).
Proof. Suppose (x)  h(x). Then, let z 2 [h(x);(x)]. Since z  (x) and
z  h(x) > x (by Lemma B.3), it follows from Lemma B.5 that D(z;x)  0
(recall that D(;x) is strictly convex with D(x;x) = D((x);x) = 0). By Lemma







Figure 5: Two-step transitions. In a ﬁrst step, a transition from mon(x;K) to
mon(y;K), y > x can be achieved with two mutations if H(x;y)  0. In a
second step, a transition from mon(y;K) to mon(x;K) and to mon(x0;K) with
x0 < x can be achieved with one mutation if D(y;x) > 0. The horizontal axis is
the ﬁrst variable of D(;) and the second of H(;). The fact that (x) < h(x)
makes possible a net “downward” transition.
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem. The remaining proof shows
that, for any x 2 [xC;xW]
T
Γ, we can construct a mon(x;K)-tree of the same
cost (i.e. number of involved mutations) as that of the mon(xW;K)-tree con-
structed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof is complicated by considerations
regarding the discretization of the strategy space.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Consider the mon(xW;K)-tree of minimal cost construc-
ted in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Theorem 3.4 will be proven if we can show
that we can modify this tree into a mon(x;K) of the same cost for all x 2
[xC;xW]
T
Γ. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: For all x 2 [xC;xW], h(x) 2 (x;2x).
In this case, h(x) > x is a strictly decreasing function, implicitly deﬁned
by H(x;h(x)) = 0 (see Lemma B.3). Moreover, h(x)  h(xW) > xW for all
x 2 [xC;xW].
Let h = minfh(x)(x) j x 2 [xC;xW]g. Since h and  are continuous by
Lemmata B.3 and B.5 and h(x) > (x) for all x 2 [xC;xW] by Lemma B.7, we
know that h > 0.




(h(x) + (x)) 2 ((x);h(x))
Let x 2 [xC;xW). By Lemma B.5, (x) > xW > x with D((x);x) = 0.
By Lemma B.4, since D((x);x) = 0 it must be that f((x)) = x and f is
strictly decreasing at (x). Since (x) <  (x) < h(x) and f((x)) = x > 0, it
follows from Lemma B.4 that x = f((x)) > f( (x))  f(h(x)). For x = xW,
(xW) = xW and hence f((xW)) = xW > f( (xW)). In summary, f( (x)) <
x for all x 2 [xC;xW].
Let f = minfx  f( (x)) j x 2 [xC;xW]g. Since f and   are continuous
by Lemmata B.3, B.4, and B.5 and x > f( (x)) for all x 2 [xC;xW], we know
that f > 0.
Let  < 1
3 minfh;fg.
Consider x0 = xW. Let y0 2 ( (x0);h(x0))
T
Γ (it exists because  <
1
3h). Since Hx(y) = H(x;y) is strictly concave in y by Lemma B.3, we know
that H(x0;y0) > 0, i.e. a transition from mon(x0;K) to mon(y0;K) with two
mutations is possible.
Let x1 2 (f( (x0));x0)
T
Γ. It exists because  < f.
Since f is decreasing, f(y0)  f( (x))  x1, which implies that D(y0;x1) 
0, i.e. the transition from mon(y0;K) to mon(x1;K) is possible with one muta-
tion.
Consider the mon(xW;K)-tree of minimal cost constructed in the proof
of Theorem 3.1. Delete the arrows leaving mon(x1;K) (which has cost 2)
and mon(y0;K) (cost 1). Replace them with the arrow from mon(x0;K) to
mon(y0;K) (cost 2) and the arrow from mon(y0;K) to mon(x1;K) (cost 1).
This yields a mon(x1;K)-tree with the same cost as the original one and hence
proves that mon(x1;K) is stochastically stable. Moreover, by Lemma A.8 all
states mon(x;K) with x in [x1;xW]
T
Γ are also stochastically stable.
Notice that the grid is a priori ﬁxed and x1 < x0, i.e. x1  x0  . This
procedure has added at least one stochastically stable state. Repeating the
argument from x1, we obtain a new stochastically stable state mon(x2;K) with
x2  x1  . After a ﬁnite number of iterations, we obtain that mon(xC;K)
is stochastically stable, and hence all monomorphic states with quantities in
[xC;xW] are stochastically stable.
Case 2: For some x 2 [xC;xW], h(x) = 2x.
Apply the same procedure as in Case 1. Let xi be the ﬁrst quantity in
the sequence constructed there such that h(xi) = 2xi. It follows that h(x) =
2x > xW for all x 2 [xC;xi]) (because h is continuous by Lemma B.3, strictly
decreasing whenever h(x) 2 (x;2x), and 2x is strictly increasing).
By Lemma B.4 f is decreasing. Since 2xi  2xC, it follows that f(2xi) 
f(2xC). Since h(xC) = 2xC and D(h(xC);xC) > 0 by Lemma B.6, we know
that f(2xC) < xC. Hence, f(2xi) < xC and D(2xi;xC) > 0.
We can set now xi+1 = xC and complete the previous tree with an arrow
from mon(xi;K) to mon(2xi;K) (at cost 2) and an arrow from mon(2xi;K) to
mon(xC;K) (at cost 1). 
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